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Part I: Prologue and Introduction 
   Comparative studies are currently fairly commonplace in many academic fields, and 
philosophy is one field in particular that has seen important developments in this area in the last 
three decades. A variety of methodologies and approaches have evolved, within a wide range of 
cross-cultural contexts, so that "comparative philosophy" is no longer, if it ever was, a single 
enterprise with a stock meaning. In some exercises, such as this one, it means revisiting a 
familiar philosophical concept, especially one which has well-established philosophical currency 
in certain cultural contexts, by considering that concept afresh in a cultural context within 
which the "functional equivalent" of that concept may not be readily apparent, but which may, 
upon careful investigation, emerge to illuminate and inform the more-familiar understanding of 
the concept in profoundly new and unfamiliar ways. 
   Therefore, when an essay, such as this one, claims to be a work in comparative philosophy, 
it behooves us to give some indication of what we mean, what we expect o do, and how we plan 
to do it. In the case of this essay, it means that we intend to consider the concept of freedom in 
terms of jinenhoni, as understood by Gotoku Shinran (1173-1263) , the Kamakura-era founder of 
the Jodo Shin-shu ('True Pure Land') sect of Japanese Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy, and 
we intend that the method of our investigation shall proceed along both analytical and 
phenomenological lines of inquiry. 
   We should also give some indication, at the outset, of what this essay is not. We have limit-
ed the scope and range of our inquiry to a single primary source because this essay is not intend-
ed as a comprehensive xamination of Shinran's religious philosophy; nor is it meant to be an 
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exhaustive explication of Shinran's understanding of jinenhoni. Our space is much too limited 
for either such project. 
   Neither are we suggesting that Shinran is intentionally offering jinenhoni as an alternative 
for other, more conventional, Japanese terms for "freedom." When we consider the Japanese 
philosophical lexicon, we find a number of terminological candidates for a philosophical discus-
sion of the concept of freedom. Probably the most frequently used is jiyu ([~ Fh), which is com-
monly translated as ` freedom' or ` liberty' or simply ` independent' or ` voluntary.' Another pos-
sibility is jizai ([~) , usually rendered as ` free will.' Either of these may serve as the basis for a 
philosophical discussion of the problem of freedom. This is especially so when Japanese 
thinkers, when considering the problem of freedom, draw upon translations of non-Japanese 
(usually Western) sources. For example, any proper Japanese translation of the works of 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Mill, Hobbes, Sartre, et. al. would be impossible without these terms. 
   When we turn to the works of certain original Japanese thinkers, however, such a depen-
dence on these terms is not necessarily so. Shinran represents a case in point, as a careful ex-
amination of his writings reveals very few occasions when he employs either of these terms. Ac-
cording to the two standard indices to his work', we find no reference to any use by Shinran, 
either in his own writings or in his quotations from other Buddhist writers, of the first term, jiyu 
([~ Fh) ; and with respect to the second term, jizai ([~ ) , we find only a few references in the in-
dices to Shinran's use of this term -- specifically, eighteen in Kyogyoshinsh5, plus seven from all 
other sources combined, making a grand total of only 25 references. Most significantly, only 
three are original statements by Shinran, and none are of any particular philosophical impor-
tance -- they are primarily references to freedom in terms of free choice, as the absence of exter-
nal constraint or imposition. Furthermore, these are primarily passing references, and are not 
developed in any meaningful ways that would seem to make a profound contribution to the 
philosophical understanding of the problem of freedom. 
   If this, then, were the extent of Shinran's thoughts on the issue, our project would be over 
before it would have begun. Fortunately, this is not the case. As it so happens, we do find one 
possibility within Shinran's conceptual framework which may serve as the foundation for a 
rather insightful and provocative response to the problem of freedom. This is the concept of ji-
nen ([~ ) , or more fully, jinenhoni (fit f) . 
   As we shall see, it is our interpretation of Shinran's understanding of the concept of 
jinenhoni that may constitute a significant contribution to the philosophical consideration of the 
problem of freedom. As mentioned above, we shall limit our inquiry to a single source for 
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Shinran's statement on the subject, a collection of letters called the Mattosho, or ` Lamp for the 
Latter Ages.' In particular, we shall investigate carefully the contents of the fifth letter, which 
was written in his 86th year and is entitled Jinenhoninokoto -- ` Concerning Jinenhoni.' The trans-
lation of this short selection which follows is largely a composite of several previous translations 
(see Bibliography), although we have chosen to forego some of the ambiguity of the original in 
favor of certain more explicit expressions, the grammatical and philosophical reasons for which 
will be explained later. It is our contention that this source offers a most succinct, albeit densely 
compacted, statement regarding the meaning of jinenhoni, and it shall be our intention to un-
pack some of the more provocative philosophical insights that may be suggested by Shinran's 
comments. Admittedly, this translation may not represent the best expression of his full 
religious intentions, but our purpose is not a thorough explication of his religious philosophy; we 
are merely looking for suggestions that might broaden and deepen our own present philosophi-
cal understanding of the concept of freedom. As we shall subsequently argue, it is the realiza-
tion of the concept of jinenhoni, as suggested by our interpretation of this short passage, that 
may provide us with a richer and fuller understanding of the concept of freedom.
Part II: Translation of Jinenhoninokoto 
       "Regarding the meaning of jinen, 'ji' means 'of itself.' It is not the contrivance of the 
   practitioner. As for the meaning of 'nen,' it is 'to be so.' 'To be so' is not the contrivance 
   of the practitioner; it is the vow of the Tathagata, which is called 'honi.' This 'honi' 
   means 'that which is so,' because of the vow of the Tathagata. Since this honi is the 
   vow of the Tathagata, it means 'to be so,' because of the virtue of this dharma, without 
   any contrivance on the part of the practitioner. For the first time, all human contrivance 
   is gone and because of this, it takes that without (purposive) meaning as its meaning. 
      Jinen originally meant 'to always be so.' The vow of Amida is never the contrivance 
   of the practitioner, but enables each practitioner to rely on the Namu Amida Butsu. It is 
   said that when one abandons self-contrivance, and ceases to speculate on the nature of 
  good and evil, that is called jinen. The nature of the vow is that all should attain supreme 
   Buddhahood. What is called 'supreme Buddhahood' is without form, and whatever is 
   without form is called jinen. So, to indicate that there is form is not to speak of the 
  supreme nirvana. It should be heard and learned for the first time that Amida has made 
   known the meaning of this formlessness. Amida is that through which jinen is made 
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known. Having realized this principle, it becomes unnecessary to discuss jinen. Further, 
to constantly seek to define the meaning of jinen is to say it has meaning. Such is the in-
conceivability of the Buddha."
Part III: Interpretation and Analysis 
   According to Shinran, ii (0) means `of itself' or ` by itself' (onozukara). Aswe shall see, 
the ontological character of this claim is all-important. `By itself' is a description ofthe being of a 
thing. It is the self-reference and self-identification f the thing with itself, the totally self-
reflexive nature of the thing qua thing. 
   However, this `by itself' may indicate more than just the 'thingly' nature of the thing, and in 
fact, exclusive concentration this aspect may obfuscate another, perhaps equally significant, 
dimension. `By itself' (onozukara) may have an ontological dimension or 'thingly' character of 
its own, `by itself.' That is, a thing may stand quite apart from other things whose self-reference 
this ` by itself' may indicate. 
   Thus, the power of ` by itself' to indicate the ontological nature, the being, of a thing, its abil-
ity to point to whatever belongs inherently to a thing -- this is simply representative of one 
aspect, one facet, of the total function of ` by itself.' This function takes account of the 'self-
effort' or 'own-power' (jiriki, 0 )j) aspect of ` by itself,' and while sufficiently alive to the 'own-
nature' (jisho, it character of the 'thing-liness,' the `being' of ` itself,' it is altogether inade-
quate to account for the 'otherness' of ` itself.' 
   This 'otherness' i  best understood interms of the via negativa, orwhat it is not. As Shinran 
says, it is not the result of individual contrivance orthe product of personal intentionality orde-
sign or effort on the part of the practitioner. Specifically, it is to be dissociated altogether f om 
any notion of 'self-effort' or 'own-power' -- namely, jiriki. Thus, any efficacy whatsoever which 
is thought to result or obtain from the exercise of jiriki is explicitly denied. 
   Similarly, nen () is also dissociated from any sense of jiriki; nen means `to be so' 
(shikarashimu). The vow of the Tathagata, the ` thus come one,' is identical with nen by way of 
their mutual meaning of ` to be so.' Further, this vow is called `honi' AM), which in this con-
text means `that which is so' as a result or product, or by virtue of, the vow of the Tathagata. 
   This honi, then, represents he first stage of our investigation. As we shall see, freedom, 
understood as jinenhoni, s comprised oftwo stages, and each stage is developed inboth a theo-
retical and practical dimension. 
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A. Stage One: Theory 
   At the first stage, in its theoretical aspect, honi means `to be so.' It is also ` the vow of the 
Tathagata,' and this is the case `because of the virtue of this dharma.' In Japanese, dharma is ho 
(f ) , so the initial theoretical basis of Shinran's claim lies in the simple recognition that honi is 
the same as the vow of the Tathagata: theoretically, either one may be understood as ` to be so' 
because of the virtue of this dharma. At this stage, the theoretical justification is to be found in 
the self-referential `virtue of this dharma' (ho f ) . In other words, theoretically, `that which is 
so' (honi) is the same as the vow of the Tathagata `by virtue of' toku; #) that vow.
B. Stage One: Practice 
   The initial practical dimension of Shinran's claim is developed by reference to the uncom-
promising denial of any measure of worth, merit, or efficacy to be attached to the action or activ-
ity of a practitioner. In effect, it is a practice which is a non-practice; in the total absence of all 
human contrivance orclaims of 'self-effort' (jiriki), any activity on the part of the practitioner is 
so ` because of the vow of the Tathagata.' Accordingly, without (self-) purposive meaning or in-
tentional content, honi s simply "`that which is so' because of the vow of the Tathagata," and 
any meaning which obtains, within the context of such a practice, must be a meaning which is 
devoid of any purposive meaning or intent. In the absence of any human contrivance or"purpo-
sive-ness," `practice' must hen take on a very different meaning, namely a meaning which is 
without (purposive) meaning. Practically speaking, this becomes a practice which is not a prac-
tice in the usual sense of the term; it is a practice which is without (practical) "purposive-ness." 
And by undercutting the purposive meaning of the practical dimension i this manner, the theo-
retical dimension (namely, that honi is the same as the vow of the Tathagata) is affected as 
well. That is, in a similar fashion, the content or meaning of the theoretical dimension becomes 
not meaningless, but rather, a meaning which is without (purposive) meaning.
C. Stage Two: Practice 
   At the second stage, the practical dimension of the claim is developed in greater detail, and 
at first glance, appears to represent merely that, a more detailed account of the first-stage prac-
tical dimension. But, as we shall see, the practical dimension of the second stage assumes a 
much greater and far-reaching consequence that that of the first stage. 
   According to Shinran, jinen originally had the meaning ` to always be so' (moto yori 
shikarashimu) . ` Moto yori' functions as an emphasizer even as it functions in a parallel construction 
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in the sentence which follows it, as a negative mphasizer in the clause which states that `the 
vow of Amida is never the contrivance of the practitioner.' It is simply the case that, as stated 
above, (ji) nen means `to be so.' It originally (literally, `from the beginning') had the meaning 
`to always be so.' Similarly, it is not simply that the vow of Amida (the Tathagata) is not now, 
nor no longer, the contrivance ofthe practitioner; it has never been so. 
   It is at this point, with the substitution ofAmida for the more general Tathagata, that the 
specific nature of the development of the practical dimension at the second stage becomes ap-
parent. By reference to Amida in particular, and the claim that ` the vow ... enables the prac-
titioner to rely on the Namu Amida Butsu' (nembutsu), the specific nature of this jinen practice 
is manifest. It is the practice (of the practitioner) which is a non-practice; it is the reliance by the 
practitioner without an effort on the part of the practitioner. 
   A two-step rocess within the practical dimension characterizes this realization: (a) the 
abandonment of self-contrivance; and (b) the cessation of speculation (particularly, on the na-
ture of good and evil). This latter condition isquite curious, iftaken in too literal a fashion. That 
is, why should the cessation of speculation regarding the nature of good and evil necessarily 
characterize the condition or state of realization of jinen? If considered merely as an inquiry into 
particularity (i.e., whether this or that is a good or bad thing), then this step in the process 
would seem to suggest simply that it is only because we cannot, through mere speculation, ex-
haust he universe of particulars, that we should cease to speculate merely because, as a process 
dealing with a (practically) inexhaustible s t of particulars (viz., all things), it would continue 
ad infinitum. 
   But it is not the case that one should abandon altogether the process of speculation simply 
because it might be an interminable nterprise; rather, two other closely connected, but 
philosophically more significant, suggestions would seem to be implied. The first is that any sort 
of speculation which bifurcates reality into two mutually exclusive categories ( uch as good and 
evil) is pointless, not simply for the reason stated above, but also because such categorization 
imposes an artificial 'either/or' judgmental nd conceptual scheme upon the nature of things, 
such that they must conform to one or the other of the two categories, if they are to be catego-
rized (and presumably, thereby rendered intelligible) at all. The two-fold assumption perative 
here is: (a) that all things are, in principle, categorize-able (inthis case, into two categories) ; 
and (b) that speculation, as the means to effect hat categorization process, is a worth-while 
means within a worth-while process. What is challenged here is the assumption ofthe worth of 
both the process and the means within the process. 
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   Therefore, the second implication would seem to be, not simply that speculation on the na-
ture of good and evil (with emphasis on the type or kind of speculation) be ceased, but rather that 
all speculation itself be summarily suspended. That is, questions regarding the nature of good 
and evil (whether in general or in particular) are just the types or kinds of speculation which 
must cease. And it is not just some particular types of speculation that are being called into ques-
tion; it is the process of speculation in toto. The final implication of this suggestion, from the per-
spective of the practical dimension, should be clear. It was never a question, or topic for specu-
lation, as to what is the right (or ` good') practice, as opposed to the wrong (or ` evil') practice; 
as we have already seen, the practical dimension of jinen is the practice which is a non-practice, 
or the practice which ` takes that without (purposive) meaning as its meaning.'
D. Stage Two: Theory 
   The second-stage theoretical dimension of freedom understood as jinenhoni begins with an 
embellished account of the theoretical significance of the vow of the Tathagata, identified as it 
is at this second stage, as the vow of Amida. 
   This second-stage theoretical claim is really a two-part claim. The first part of the claim is 
that ` the nature of the vow is that all should attain supreme Buddha-hood.' The second part of 
the claim is that "whatever is without form is called ` jinen."' We will consider the first part of 
the claim first. 
   We have already indicated, at the first-stage theoretical level, what is meant by ` the nature 
of the vow.' It is `to be so.' Further, ` that which is so' (honi) is the same as the vow of the 
Tathagata by virtue of that vow (cf. p. 79, above). Now, if honi is identified with the vow of the 
Tathagata, then it is the nature of honi that ` all should attain supreme Buddha-hood.' What is 
meant is that all should attain to the universal condition of authentic existence. It is a condition 
which is realizable in principle by all sentient beings. Therefore, it is the nature of honi that, the-
oretically, all should realize this authenticity. This `supreme Buddha-hood,' specifically, is that 
which is `without form,' and, theoretically, "whatever is without form is called ` jinen."' 
   That this is an expansion of the theoretical dimension of our account may be demonstrated 
by the following grammatical note. What is translated as `called' (toiu) indicates an indirect 
quotation or indirect reference, or even hearsay testimony. By this, two purposes are served 
simultaneously: (a) it functions as a disclaimer of any personal authority or even any 
metaphysical bsolutizing, as an identity claim very often (but not necessarily) does; and (b) it 
contributes a certain directness, a certain commonplace, `ordinary language' type of appeal. 
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The first purpose amounts to a qualified appeal to authority, the qualification being constituted 
by the personal disclaimer; the second purpose amounts to an appeal to everyday, `lived' ex-
perience. 
   The second-stage theoretical claim, that "whatever is without form is called ` jinen,"' is at 
first glance, simply an appeal to the common, everyday, `ordinary language' understanding of ji-
nen. However, by implication, it is much more than that. In fact, it is at this point that Shinran's 
consideration of freedom, understood as jinenhoni, assumes its most profound relevance and 
greatest significance. 
   If, in Japanese, jinenhoni is understood as ` naturalness' or ` spontaneity,' then our interpre-
tation of the term is entirely in keeping with its most original or fundamental meaning. If 
"whatever is without form is called ` jinen
,"' and jinen is used in reference to the natural or spon-
taneous, then whatever is natural or spontaneous in the sense of being non-pre-determined, or
without being constituted or structured from without -- creative, in the fullest sense of the word --
is formless. Jinen is, in a word, freedom, a freedom of the highest order, creative freedom, the 
freedom of creative formlessness. 
   We have thus made explicit what was merely implicit at the most fundamental level of the 
meaning of jinen, that whatever is formless, in the sense delineated above, is that which is free: 
it is the most natural, the most spontaneous, the most creative. It is a response to a given situa-
tion or circumstance, not one which is pre-determined or structured or formed by the situation. 
It is a response which is truly responsive, i.e., spontaneously and creatively. It is a response 
which is responsive to itself, to its own creativity, to its own special sense of appropriateness. It 
is `given,' according to the form or structure of the context within which it appears, but only 
upon the condition that it is not itself formed by that context. In the fullest, most authentic 
sense, it appropriates the contents of a given situation, within the giveness of the form or struc-
ture of that context, without being itself structured. If anything, it 'in-forms' that context in the 
sense that it works within the structure of a given context or situation to further form or struc-
ture that situation, but not at the same time to allow itself to be determined by that situation. In 
the purest sense, it is not something external to or independent of any situation; it is the natural, 
spontaneous, free, and creative response of the situation to itself, the response of the informing 
within the formed, not as opposed to the formed, but as constitutive of it. 
   That freedom may serve as a constitutive element within a given context or situation 
should be clear; but to emphasize this point to the neglect of the fact that the context may limit 
or otherwise influence the expression of freedom would be a gross imbalance. To reinstate 
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equilibrium, we need to look more closely at the exact nature of the relationship of freedom vis-
a-vis the context or situation of its expression. 
   In other words, the nature of the relationship of freedom, understood as jinen, to any situa-
tion or circumstance within which it may be said to appropriately obtain, is not so one-sided as 
the fore-going description may seem to suggest. Rather, these two must be understood as abid-
ing together in what we might describe as a 'conditionship relation.' On the one hand, to simply 
assert that jinen is the condition by which or according to which freedom takes place would be 
somewhat misleading. On the other hand, however, to assert that the term ` freedom' is simply 
descriptive of the conditions by which, or according to which, jinen occurs is likewise to miss 
the point. 
   In this connection, it is clear what freedom is not. It is not simply the absence or lack of con-
straints or limitations. Rather, it is to be understood in a much richer and fuller sense. Perhaps 
we may characterize the nature of the relationship of freedom (understood as jinen) with its ap-
propriate context, a relationship which we have identified above as a 'conditionship relation,' in 
the following manner. This relationship is clearly not a ` relation between.' Properly speaking, 
we are not here dealing with two (or more) entities for there to be a relationship between. For 
that matter, there is no sense of any 'betweenness' at all, and for that reason, the 'conditionship 
relation' sees the context or circumstances of the authentic attainment or realization of jinen as 
the total arena within which this realization is manifest. Instead of a view of freedom as simply a 
perspective which (albeit critically) views the scope of the arena, with an eye for identifying 
whatever constraints or limitations may appear within the perimeters of that arena -- freedom, 
then, constituting the manner in which or by which these may be successfully avoided or elimi-
nated -- Shinran's in an interpretation of freedom which is descriptive, not of the contents of the 
arena, but of the authentic realization of human existence within the very broad perimeters or 
horizons of that arena. In this way, freedom is not a perspective at all. It is a collective term 
which is descriptive of the various types of activities which obtain under any circumstance or 
within any context or situation -- namely, those activities which are spontaneous, natural, and 
creative. 
   Let us conclude our explication of the second-stage theoretical dimension of this theory of 
freedom understood as jinenhoni by considering the role of Amida in all this. According to Shin-
ran, theoretically, it is only through Amida that the meaning of the formless nature of jinen is 
made known. This would seem to follow from the first-stage practical dimension, whereby the 
realization of jinen was understood, not as the result of any contrivance or self-effort on the part 
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of the practitioner, but only as a result of the vow of the Tathagata. 
   Now, at the second stage, this same claim is made even more explicitly. It is only through 
Amida that jinen is made know. Any realization that is to be authentic realization may not obtain 
or result from any effort or contrivance of a practitioner. In this regard, the very sense of ` prac-
titioner' is rendered practically vacuous, and we should note that the term does not even occur in 
our discussion of the second-stage development. Strictly speaking, there is no practitioner, just 
as, strictly speaking, there is no practice. What there is, is the attainment of freedom, the reali-
zation of jinen, by a human agent, but not as the result of any human agency or contrivance. 
Freedom is attained, or jinen is realized, through the mediating agency of Amida. 
   This sense of freedom is not to be understood in any teleological sense, whereby Amida is 
the means to an end, viz., the attainment of human freedom. Freedom, as jinen, is not the final 
accomplishment arrived at after the completion of a long, involved process; rather it is the 
refinement and cultivation of the process itself. It is the continuous and on-going response of 
man, as a being-in-the-world, to that world. And, as a creative response, it is not simply a pas-
sive response to the circumstances and situations of that world; it is an active, dynamic, con-
stitutive -- in the fullest sense, free and creative -- response. To say that 'Amida is that through 
which jinen is made known' is not to relocate the purposiveness ense of human agency within 
some extra-human agent; it is to deny the sense of purposive agency altogether. 
   To say that 'Amida is that through which jinen is made known' is to create a perspective 
from which freedom as jinen may be viewed in the all-important sense of being divested of its 
human agency. Only in this manner is the realization of authentic freedom, as spontaneity, 
naturalness, creativity -- in a word, jinen -- possible. Only by shifting the perspective of human 
activity away from the sense of self-contrivance, self-effort, or self-accomplishment may 
authentic freedom be realized. 
   Once this principle of jinen is realized, in the manner and to the degree prescribed, any fur-
ther discussion of any sort is rendered superfluous and unnecessary. This is not so much a 
device to forestall disagreement, but rather a reiteration of the earlier principle regarding the 
uselessness of speculation altogether; or, as we suggested above (p. 81, ff), an appeal for the 
process of speculation itself to be suspended. In addition, in this case, it is not simply that specu-
lation is meaningless; however, ` to constantly seek to define jinen is to say it has meaning.' 
Neither is this to suggest that jinen is meaningless; rather, as we saw above (p. 81, ff), in its 
theoretical dimension, it is imbued with ` a meaning which is without (purposive) meaning.' 
   Shinran ends with a final disclaimer, that ` such is the inconceivability of the wisdom of the 
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Buddha.' We take this to be a short-hand formula which serves two purposes, the first one 
epistemological, and the second one ontological. First, epistemologically, it suggests that 
whatever intelligibility obtains from our understanding of the concept of jinen does so as a func-
tion of the limitations of human insight, intelligence, and sensitivity, not as a result of some in-
herent difficulty in the concept itself, or in the state of affairs which it is designed to describe. 
Second, that this concept of jinen is indeed intelligible (i.e., ` conceivable') at all is assured onto-
logically by the 'suchness' of the concept itself. 
   That the ` wisdom of the Buddha' is `inconceivable' is a reflection of the epistemological in-
telligibility of the concept of jinen; however, the extent, manner, and degree to which this con-
cept is realized, attained, or achieved is a result, not of its epistemological or conceptual nature, 
but as a function of its ontological grounding. To explicate this ontological ground is to substan-
tiate not simply the conceptual or theoretical dimension of our claim, but more importantly, to 
give ontological credence to the practical dimension as well. The remainder of our essay shall be 
devoted to just such explication. 
   In summary, then, the salient points of Shinran's argument for the concept of freedom as 
understood in term of jinenhoni might be recapitulated as follows. 
   We perceived the structure of jinenhoni as developing in two stages, and within each of 
these stages, we discerned both theoretical and practical dimensions. At the first stage of the 
development, `practice' was understood as a practice which is without (practical) purposive-
ness, and theoretically, this practice, while not rendered meaningless, is a practice which is 
without (purposive) meaning. However, at this first stage, the details of these claims were not 
specified, and any significance or implication beyond the claims themselves was not indicated. 
   The second stage, on the other hand, explicated these rather bold, but not at all self-evi-
dent, assertions. At this stage, we saw that the practical dimension amounted to a reliance by 
the practitioner, without any effort on the part of the practitioner, upon the vow of Amida, as 
that through which jinen is made known. As we saw, the attainment of freedom in terms of the 
realization of jinen, is accomplished, not as the result of any intentional or purposive human 
agency, but only as the natural, spontaneous, and creative response of man, as a being-in-the-
world, to the various situations and circumstances that characterize the world.
Part IV: Postscript and Conclusion 
   It remains for us to explicate, as promised, the ontological grounding of the concept of 
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jinen. We have already suggested that the extent, manner, and degree to which jinen is realized, 
attained, or achieved is a function of this ontological grounding, and, further, that to explicate 
this ground shall be to substantiate both the theoretical and practical dimensions of Shinran's 
argument for the concept of jinen as constituting the basis for an understanding of freedom. 
   To demonstrate the ontological ground of the concept of jinen shall require that we review 
the earlier discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of our interpretation, only this time 
with an eye for evidence which might support our current claim. We should not have to look far. 
   We might begin with a reconsideration of the opening remarks of Part III of our essay. It 
may be recalled that at this point, the barest hint of an ontological structure was exposed, but it 
was quickly lost in the subsequent discussion of the relationship between honi and the vow of 
the Tathagata. Initially, we argued that honi represented the first stage in the theoretical dimen-
sion of our claim, that it is the same as the vow of the Tathagata, by ` virtue' (toku) of that vow. It 
might appear that the only ontological assertion being proffered here is a most straight-forward 
one, in two parts: (a) the identification of honi with the vow of the Tathagata; and (b) the 
justification for such an identity as a function of the ` virtue' (i.e., the character, nature or 
strength) of the vow itself. But throughout our analysis, one crucial point has remained unstat-
ed, obscured by our own, perhaps misleading, translation of 'shikarashimu.' This all-important 
term, which we have rendered `to be so' might be better elaborated (if not translated) in terms 
which more clearly indicate its grammatical form, namely a causative one. Therefore, it is im-
portant for us to realize that the verb 'shikarashimu' is used to mean ` that (a thing) is made to 
be/become that which it is.' With this more fully elaborated translation/ interpretation in mind, 
we may proceed to give a full account of the nature of the ontological grounding of the concept 
of jinen. 
   At the beginning of Part III, we saw that 'ji' meant `of itself' or ` by itself' (onozukara), and 
we suggested that this ` by itself' may have two meanings: (a) it may indicate the 'own-nature' 
or 'thing-liness' of a thing ` by itself;' or (b) it may be used to indicate the altogether separate na-
ture, or independence, the 'other-liness,' of a thing ` by itself.' The first sense is not intended as a 
metaphysical claim having to do with the substance of the thing in question, but rather an onto-
logical claim, referring primarily to the 'is-ness' of a thing, the 'that-ness,' rather than the quidi-
ty or 'what-ness' of a thing. It is the assertion that a thing is, "it is the self-reference and self-
identification of the thing with itself; it is the totally self-reflexive nature of the thing qua thing" 
(cf. p. 78) . 
   To deny that the first sense of 'onozukara' is devoid of any metaphysical sense of substance, 
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however, is not to say that it is devoid of any metaphysical sense whatsoever. Such a claim 
would fly in the face of the facts, namely, that much more than the quidity or 'what-ness' of a 
thing is claimed for 'ji' -- the 'how-ness' is clearly asserted as well. It is not simply, or 
exclusively, that a thing is as it is; the ` how' of the thing is equally significant. And according to 
our translation, `how' a thing is to be is `by itself.' 
   We need to consider in greater detail the second sense of 'onozukara' as well. We indicated 
above that this term may be used to indicate the altogether separateness or independence or 
'other-liness' of a thing ` by itself.' Taken in conjunction with the first sense, we have a more 
complete picture of what it means for a thing to be ` by itself.' It is not the case that a thing simp-
ly or exclusively is self-identical with it-self; it is also of or by itself in the sense that it is other -- it 
is other than things which are by them-selves. It is separate or independent in the sense that it is 
distinctive (or at least, distinguishable) from other things. The `other' side of a thing's being 
self-reflexive and self-identical is its complementary character of being (at least in principle) 
distinguishable or discernable from other things, even those things with which it may be identi-
fied. 
   This problem of the indiscernability of identicals is an old and familiar one, considered in 
one form or another by virtually anyone who has dealt with the problem of identity, and given 
perhaps its most complete expression in the works of Leibniz (see, especially, his Correspon-
dences). The problem appears before us if we restate the claims of the first-stage theoretical 
dimension in symbolic form as follows: 
   According to Shinran: 
       i. A=B (nen is `to be so') 
   But he also tells us that: 
       ii. B = -C ('to be so' is not the contrivance of the practitioner) 
      iii. B = D ('to be so' is the vow of the Tathagata) 
      iv. D = E (the vow of the Tathagata is honi) 
       v. E = B (honi is `to be so') 
      vi. E = -C (honi is not the contrivance of the practitioner) 
   From this we may conclude that, because nen is `to be so' (i), it is also: (a) not the con-
trivance of the practitioner [this follows from (ii)1; (b) the vow of the Tathagata [this follows 
from (iii)1; and (c) most importantly, nen is identical with honi [this follows deductively from 
(v), or indirectly from (iv) by way of induction from (iii)1. We also know that the reading of ni 
( in honi &M) is shikarashimeru, which is equivalent o the meaning of nen (M in jinen ) . 
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   When all of this is taken together, we arrive at a reduction, whereby our analysis may be 
(at least terminologically) somewhat simplified. By identifying both nen and ni with 
shikarashimu -- in other words, if nen and ni are functionally equivalent in terms of meaning 
(viz., shikarashimu), then the phrase `jinenhoni' may be justifiably shortened to the more com-
pact 'jinen,' without any significant sacrifice of meaning. But while this reduction may stream-
line our terminology, it does not entirely validate our conclusions. 
   Unfortunately, in the interest of space, we must content ourselves with this all-too-brief an 
account of the problem of identity in general if we are to conclude our quest for the ontological 
grounding of jinen. Suffice to say, while the problem of identity is one which persists throughout 
this entire essay, it is one which deserves eparate, and exhaustive, treatment. What is current-
ly at issue, viz., the justification of the ontological grounding of jinen, while related, is one which 
may be resolved somewhat, although not entirely, independent of the problem of identity. It is 
hoped that the above remarks concerning this latter problem shall be sufficient for our immedi-
ate purposes. 
   We shall at present need to return to our earlier remarks concerning the grammatical form 
of shikarashimu, for herein lies the crux of the issue. If, as indeed it is the case that, 
shikarashimu is a causative form, we shall be obliged to account for the significance of such a 
form, if not by the way we translate the term, then certainly according to the manner in which 
we interpret it. 
   Our difficulty results from the need, on the one hand, to be absolutely clear about what a 
causative form, in Japanese, means; and on the other hand, the obligation to render, as briefly 
and as concisely as possible, a translation (not explanation) for a term which occurs in this 
form. To that end, then, we should reflect on the observation that, grammatically, the causative 
form is used to "note causation" (cf. Martin, p. 294). For the grammarians part, this ` notation' 
is required to be both connotative as well as denotative. We have already suggested that ` to be 
so' may not be the most grammatically accurate translation for shikarashimu; if anything, it is 
(perhaps) the most grammatically-neutral rendering. However, in as much as it clearly fails to 
explicitly denote causation, and in so far as it apparently fails to convey any connotative sense of 
causation as well, we are left with the rather unhappy circumstance of a translation which is no 
(grammatically) proper translation at all. Perhaps the only resolution to this dilemma is to rev-
iew what is meant by `causative' in the first place, and perhaps only with this clarification in 
mind shall we be able to render a more acceptable translation. To accomplish this, we shall need 
to look more closely at the Japanese `causative.' 
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   It might be instructive to mention that the Japanese causative form, which ` notes causation' 
(as we have seen above), must not be confused with a causal form, which, grammatically is used 
to express a cause. It may appear to be a very fine line to draw between `noting causation' and 
`expressing a cause
,' but the relevance of the distinction may lie in the relative force of the two 
expressions. That is, the difference here is one of degree, not kind. To `note causation' is to ob-
serve, remark about, or simply take heed of the action of causing or producing. To `express a 
cause,' on the other hand, is a much stronger claim: it is a two-part assertion, both how a cause 
is, as well as that it is. The ` causative,' then, is a phenomenologically descriptive account of a 
process, an activity; it is, at most, an ontological observation of the fact of causation. The 
`causal
,' however, goes beyond mere ontological observation (that a cause is), to make a more 
metaphysical claim, the assertion of how a cause is. It is unnecessary for us to develop the sig-
nificance of these differences any further. Rather, it is sufficient for our purposes to merely 
draw the lines as we have, indicating the differences of degree and emphasis, to reiterate that it 
is indeed a causative (not a causal) form with which we are concerned, and to content ourselves 
with the completion of our analysis of the causative form, with the above remarks in mind. 
   An investigation, then, of the meaning of the causative form, in Japanese, reveals that it 
"ranges from permission to coercion" (Martin
, p. 294) ;and further, the translation ranges from 
"`makes him do it' to ` lets him do it... (ibid). Perhaps it is this enormously wide range of possi-
ble meanings (and uses) which accounts for the enormously wide range of translations as well.2 
Be that as it may, it is clear that this form, in Japanese, embraces uch a wide range of meanings 
that, in every case, the particular circumstances of a given context may be the only clue for the 
translator as to which translation, from an equally broad range of possibilities, is most suitable. 
From a choice of meanings, which range from the most aggressive to the most passive or sub-
missive, and a choice of translations, with an equally wide range, a host of possibilities present 
themselves. Without some further criterion, in addition to contextual clues, the translator's task 
would appear to be a hopeless one. 
   Fortunately, we have in the Japanese causative one further characteristic which helps to 
narrow our range of choices somewhat. This is the condition, as Martin observes (loc. cit.) that 
"the Japanese causative requires the instigator to be someone other than the agent." It is within 
this qualification that we find, if not the salvation for the translator, then surely inspiration for 
the expositor. 
   Now, we saw earlier (p. 78, and again, p. 87, above) that onozukara s the meaning of ji may 
be used to indicate the ` separateness' or 'other-liness' of a thing ` by itself.' When we consider 
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this claim now, in light of Martin's remarks concerning the requirement of a Japanese causative 
(viz., shikarashimu), that the instigator be someone other than the agent, a more complete, and 
perhaps more intelligible picture comes into view. 
   What is this picture? As we have already seen (p.88, above), both nen and ni mean (the 
same as) shikarashimu. For that reason, we have been able to justifiably reduce the terms of our 
formula for freedom from the larger jinenhoni to the simpler jinen, without sacrifice of meaning. 
Thus we are left with ji (which means `by itself') and nen (which means shikarashimu); or to 
put it another way, we are left with jinen which means 'shikarashimu by itself.' 
   With this identification of jinen as 'shikarashimu by itself' we might satisfy Martin's last 
condition for the meaning of a causative form, without the need to translate it. That is, if the in-
stigator of the causal, or better, causative, action is to be someone (or something) other than the 
agent, then just such a locus may be indicated by means of the ` separateness' or 'other-liness' of 
a thing ` by itself.' As we saw above, ji means `by itself,' but this ` by itself' may have two mean-
ings. Thus, it is not ji in the first sense as the 'own-nature' or 'thing-liness' of a thing ` by itself' 
which serves as the instigator of the causative action. In this sense, ji is the agent of the causa-
tive, and therefore ineligible to act as instigator. It is ji in the second or ` other' sense -- its use to 
indicate the altogether separate nature or independence, the 'other-liness' of a thing ` by itself' --
which is able to act in just this required fashion. 
   Ji means onozukara -- `by itself.' As we have already seen, this term might have an ontologi-
cal dimension or 'that-ness' about it. Further, we saw that, while devoid of any metaphysical 
sense of substance, this term was not devoid of metaphysical sense altogether; instead, a certain 
'how-ness' is clearly asserted, viz., ` by itself.' 
   Nen means shikarashimu. Just how this 'shikarashimu' is to be translated still remains a 
problem. But how it is to be understood should be clear. In so far as it is a causative form, we are 
not required to read any metaphysical sense into the term, as we might be were it rendered in a 
causal form. But this is good news, since our purpose has not been to establish the metaphysical 
ground for the concept of jinen, only the ontological ground. And in this respect, we have been 
successful. If the causative form of shikarashimu is a "phenomenologically descriptive account 
of a process or activity ... an ontological observation of the fact of causation" (p. 89, above), 
then ascribing causal agency to Amida (or anything else) is a metaphysical leap which Shinran 
(or others) may make out of religious conviction, but not one we are compelled to follow out of 
logical necessity. Quite simply, to say that "Amida is that though which jinen is made known" is 
not necessarily to say that Amida is the cause of jinen (cf. p. 84). 
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   Regrettably, we have elected to leave our key term, 'shikarashimu,' untranslated in any 
proper fashion. Our difficulty is in finding an English equivalent which conveys the necessary 
breadth and depth of causative meaning which the Japanese term conveys. Thus, to opt for the 
rather awkward ` to be so' is to accept a translation which is so vague and inelegant as to defy 
any reader to guess its original (Japanese) grammatical construction. On the other hand, to opt 
for some of the alternatives which various other translators have proffered (see footnote 2, 
above) is to confine and delimit this term to expressing causal agency, which may or may not 
have been the author's intent. Such options may be equally objectionable as our own, albeit for 
different reasons. 
   We are left, therefore, with the unfinished task of translating as well as explicating a 
(perhaps) untranslatable term. That we shrink from the former task (i.e., translation) is 
regrettable, but perhaps unavoidable, given the conceptual incommensurability of the two lan-
guages. However, we trust that we have risen satisfactorily to the challenge of the latter (i.e., 
explication), as demonstrated by the foregoing essay.
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